

PHR authorization guide

Personal Health Record

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Kela

Change history

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1 Introduction

This document describes authorization profiles and flows for My Kanta Personal Health Record (Finnish Kanta PHR). The document is intended for implementers of applications that communicate with Finnish Kanta PHR.

All Kanta PHR related material for application implementers is published at [Kanta-pages](#)

The endpoint addresses in this document are exemplary and actual addresses will be published by Kela.

Should you have any comments on this document, please provide feedback via kanta@kanta.fi.

2 Client types

There are three types of PHR clients. Authorization protocols differ depending on the client type being used.

Note that native applications are not supported at the moment.

2.1 Personal use

2.1.1 Public client for personal use

Native applications designed for mobile operating systems (e.g. Android, iOS, Windows Phone) that can store client credentials in a secure environment provided by the mobile device. Client credentials are instance-specific, which means that they are generated by the client separately for every installation of the application on every device.




Figure 1: Data and control flows for public clients for personal use. Note that the vertical or horizontal order of the connectors is not necessarily the same as the order of phases in the authorization process.

In the authorization, the public client for personal use uses the web browser which uses the user authentication server and PHR authorization server. Client is also connected into PHR authorization server and PHR resource server.

2.1.2 Confidential client for personal use

Web applications that have server side business logic and that are capable of protecting application-specific client secrets. Such applications can also be uniquely identified through client authentication with a client certificate, using mutual TLS. Examples of confidential clients are web-based customer portals.




Figure 2: Data and control flows for confidential clients for personal use. Note that the vertical or horizontal order of the connectors is not necessarily the same as the order of phases in the authorization process.

In the authorization, the web browser uses confidential client for personal use, user authentication server, and PHR authorization server. The client uses PHR authorization server and PHR resource server.

2.1.3 Personal client tokens for both client types

When the application requests a token and authorization, it should know which user they concern. Pseudonym is returned with the token and they should be matched by the application. Refresh token is user specific and must be stored safely.

The refresh token for server-based applications expires after one year if integration has not been used, in which case users must renew the application's permissions. Applications may not extend the validity of the refresh token without the user's permission.

2.2 Professional use

2.2.1 Client for professional use

All clients that are targeted for use by health and social care professionals are considered confidential clients. This does not mean that professionals cannot use native mobile apps or desktop clients to access PHR data. However, if that is the case, all communication with PHR must be done via their organization's authorization server acting as a backend for the apps, i.e. such implementations will not communicate directly with PHR. The organization's authorization server is also responsible for the authentication of users and for ensuring that they have necessary professional rights for the access to patient or customer data.




Figure 3: Data and control flows for professional clients. Note that the vertical or horizontal order of the connectors is not necessarily the same as the order of phases in the authorization process.

In the authorization, a professional-client uses a user authentication server, a professional rights server, and a professional's organization's authorization server. The Professional organization's authorization server uses PHR authorization server and PHR resource server.

3 Client registration

Before a client can use PHR, the client must be tested and certified. Kela provides testing requirements and coordinates testing. Certification is performed by Kela or an assigned third party operator according to the guidelines published by the National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL). A tested and certified client can be registered to PHR. Registration information is maintained by Kela and is used in the user-initiated authorization process.

At the sandbox environment developers can register clients with self-service registration.

3.1 Registering client for personal use

The minimum information needed for the registration of a public client for personal use is:

Name	Value
Application name	The name must be the same as the one used for marketing purposes and for registering the client in the application stores of mobile OS providers. The name will be displayed to the user by the authorization server during the authorization process.
Application id	A unique identifier, assigned to the client by the Kela in registration process. The identifier will be used by the client instance registration endpoint to identify the client software in order to register its instances.
Application version	The version identifier of the registered application software.
Application description	A short description of purpose of the application.
Redirect URI	The URI to which an authorization code is sent after successful authorization of the client by its user.

Name	Value
Contact information	Contact details of the organization responsible for marketing and maintaining the client.
Application logo	The logo must be the same as the one used for marketing purposes and for registering the client in the application stores of mobile OS providers. The logo will be displayed to the user by the authorization server during the authorization process.
Scopes	The scopes define the rights that the client requires for its correct functioning. The scopes are set when the client is registered and cannot be extended or narrowed by the client or its user during the authorization process. The scopes are described in Section 7
Authentication method	What kind of user authentication service or method client uses for user authentication.
PKCE usage	Yes/No

For confidential clients Backend certificate OID is needed. The certificate used by the client's backend for communication with the authorization server and the resource server. The certificate must be issued by the Population Register Centre of Finland (DVV). Certificates are not used in the sandbox environment.

Upon registration, Kela will provide the client developer a client secret if the client can't use a client certificate (native mobile apps). The client secret is used in the client instance registration flow as described in Section 4. A reasonable protection of the client secret must be implemented (e.g. obfuscation) so that its extraction from the software distribution package or its installation is not trivial.

After the registration of the software, software id and initial access token are returned for the software developers to store securely and for using in the dynamic registration of client instances.

3.2 Registering a client for professional use

The minimum information needed for the registration of a client for professional use is:

Name	Value
Organisation OID	The organization oid of the social and healthcare service provider
Contact information	Contact details of the organization responsible for marketing and maintaining the client.
Backend certificate OID	The certificate used by the client's backend for communication with the authorization server and the resource server. The certificate must be issued by the Population Register Centre of Finland (DVV). Certificates aren't used in the sandbox environment.
Scopes	The scopes define the rights that the client requires for its correct functioning. The scopes are set when the client is registered and cannot be extended or narrowed by the client or its user during the authorization process. The scopes are described in Section 7

4 Client instance registration for public clients for personal use

Prior to the use of the authorization endpoint, instances (each installation) of public clients for personal use must be registered according to OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol [RFC7591]. An initial access token is provided to the client developer by Kela after successful certification of the client software and after its registration with the PHR service. The initial access token is used as part of the software statement for registering instances of the registered client software.




Figure 4: Client instance registration

A client instance starts the registration flow by generating a JSON web key (JWK) set [RFC7517] on the device. The set is composed of two EC keys, private and public. The private key MUST be stored in the secure memory of the device. Keys MUST NOT be shared among instances of client software. PHR authorization server validates software statement and it generates unique client instance identifier. Identifier is sent with the return message.

The following key types and other parameters are supported in the description of the public key that will be required in the next step of the registration flow:

Name	Meaning	Cardinality	Value
kty	Key type Elliptic curve	required	"EC"
use	Public key use	required	"sig"
kid	Key ID	required	Random and unique uuid

Name	Meaning	Cardinality	Value
crv	Cryptographic curve used with the key	required	"P-256"
x	X coordinate for the Elliptic Curve point	required	Base64url encoding of the octet string representation of the coordinate
y	y coordinate for the Elliptic Curve point	required	Base64url encoding of the octet string representation of the coordinate
alg	Algorithm used	required	"ES256"

Next, the client instance generates a software statement that includes the following fields and values:

Name	Meaning	Cardinality	Value
client_name	Application name	required	Application name that MUST match the one provided in the client registration.
software_id	Application ID	required	Application ID that MUST match the one provided in the

Name	Meaning	Cardinality	Value
			client registration.
device_id	Id for the device software is installed on	required	Unique identifier for the installation instance of the software, such that the users can separate between multiple installations on devices
jwtks	JSON web key set	required	JSON web key set containing the public key generated by the client instance.
initial_access_token	Initial access token	required	The initial access token that MUST match the one provided by Kela to the software vendor upon client registration.
scope	Scopes	required	The scopes needed by the client instance.

Name	Meaning	Cardinality	Value
			All of the scopes the instance need access to must be listed here and all of them must be registered for the software
grant_types	Token flows used	required	Possible options are "authorization code" for the auth code flow and "refresh_token" if the application can store the refresh token securely and use it to refresh the tokens.

The following is an example of the software statement:

```
{
  "client_name": "The Example Software client",
  "software_id": "ExampleId123",
  "device_id" : "Example Phone 1",
```

```
"jwks": {  
  
  "keys": [  
  
    {  
  
      "kty": "EC",  
  
      "use": "sig",  
  
      "kid": "6a8747e1-cd1f-4a12-b417-c151ebdae68c",  
  
      "crv": "P-256",  
  
      "x": "4Q_39cHeN6_s7du40b2FkiTGfEFKiOj3x7YydXDMf9A",  
  
      "y": "He4HSzRyMfap08gaL0YbQLpHKG7cNJD3JvQ64TMrpGY"  
    }  
  
  ]  
  
},  
  
  "initial_access_token":  
  "JncmFudF9ds0eXBicyl6WyJhdXRob3JsdpemF0aW9uX2NvZGUlLsdCJyZWZyZgfXNoX3Rvad2Vulldfg0slmFwcGdpcY2F0aW9uX",  
  
  "scope": "offline_access patient/Observation.read patient/Observation.write",  
  
  "grant_types": [  
  
    "authorization_code",  
  
    "refresh_token"
```

```
    ],  
  
    "token_endpoint_auth_method": "private_key_jwt",  
  
    "request_object_signing_alg": "ES256",  
  
    "token_endpoint_auth_signing_alg": "ES256",  
  
    "redirect_uris": [  
  
        "http://localhost/application/example"  
  
    ],  
  
    "application_type": "native",  
  
    "jti":  
    "WhTTEdYQ1VyRTBNdWI1bFFaeTBfdzh0cTJxQ0JOY3hFeFAwMlhQeUs5SWZ4a2JuSFZ1  
    VIBtRXIKbjdYdHpYcVpWQ21neTBrSI9RVHhrTm9kQVE3M1dwdUpRZm84eWY4cVZmc1ZT  
    WEp6MEpxdnpISWdlUIBtTVFNTFhOVWg2cFphcVR4Z2QwUjZMOHlxS0pSeTcxV1c1dUp5  
    dGYzRjlZMGJXWHIYbXhickF4ZjN1Um1kb0N4NGhfbzd4OG1"  
  
    }
```

The software statement is asymmetrically signed by the client instance using its private key according to specification JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7517]. Then it is submitted to the registration endpoint of the authorization server. The following is an example of the registration request, signed with the private key using EC DSA with SHA-256 algorithm:

POST /register HTTP/1.1

Content-Type: application/json

Accept: application/json

Host: phrauth.kanta.fi

```
{  
  
  "software_statement":  
    "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9.eyJzb2Z0d2FyZV9pZC16IklvV4YW1wbGVJZDEyMyIsImluaXRpYWxfYWNjZXNzX3Rva2VuljoiSm5jbUZ1ZEY5ZHMwZWVhCm5STZxeUpoZFhSb2IzSnNkcGVtRjBhVz11WDJOdlpHVWIMc2RDSnlaV1p5WmdmWE5vWDNSdmFkMIZ1SWxkZmcwc0ltRndjR2R4cFkyRjBhVz11WCIsInRva2VuX2VuZHBvaW50X2F1dGhfc2lnbmluZ19hbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImp3a3MiOnsia2V5cyl6W3sia3R5ljoirUMiLCJ1c2UiOiJzaWciLCJjcnYiOiJQLTI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjZhODc0N2UxLWNkMWYtNGExMi1iINDE3LWmxNTFIYmRhZTY4YyIsIngia0iJCSXVQVUJRS0VQdmE1cV9XNEs2NkIGdXc0cWViVDZTYiIDME5yY0FWZVpBliwieSI6ImYwVkhkU1g5TmRjTVBLVEpQVEVRyVloNUFVLWNpTUK3UlgvVTQ3R25LVE0ifV19LcJncmFudF90eXBicyl6WyJhdXRob3JpemF0aW9uX2NvZGUilCJyZWZyZXNoX3Rva2Vull0sImFwcGxpY2F0aW9uX3R5cGUlOiJuYXRpdmlCJzY29wZSI6Im9mZmxpbmVfYWNjZXNzIHBhdGllbnRcL09ic2VydmlF0aW9uLnJlYWQgcGF0aWVudFwvT2JzZXJ2YXRpb24ud3JpdGUilCJyZXF1ZXN0X29iamVjdF9zaWduaW5nX2FsZyl6IklvVTMjU2liwicmVkaXJlY3RfdXJpcyl6WyJodHRwOlwXC9sb2NhbGhvc3RcL2FwcGxpY2F0aW9uXC9leGFtcGxlI0sImNsaWVudF9uYW11IjoilVGHlIEV4YW1wbGUgU29mdHdhcmUgY2xpZW50liwidG9rZW5fZW5kcG9pbmRfYXV0aF9tZXRob2QiOiJwcmli2YXRlX2tleV9qd3QiLCJqdGkiOiJXaFRURWRZUTFWevJUQk5kV0kxYkZGYWVUQmZkemgwY1RKeFEwSk9ZM2hGZUZBd01saFFIVXM1U1daNGEySnVTRloxVmxCdFJYbEtiamRZZEhwWWNWcFdRMjFuZVRcclNsOVJWSGhyVG05a1FWRTNMMWR3ZlVwUiptODRlV1k0Y1ZabWMxWIRXRXA2TUVweGRucGxTV2RsVWxzdFRWRk5URmhpVlIdnMmNGcGhjVII0WjJRd1VqWk1PSGx4UzBwU2VUY3hWMWmxZlVwNWRHwXpSamxaTUdKWFdlbFlhWghpY2tGNFpqTjFVbTFRyYjBONE5HaGZiemQ0T0cxIn0._SfWoOo_bIX7hLYD6E1cTbM4z9hx8O_o4Ttyl1_UsFGSVY9V0hTFfiYIzfQa2mJA-R9I3KliA49iF7X11kX7EQ"  
  
}
```

Upon successful validation of the registration request the authorization server will assign a `client_id` to the client instance. The following is an example of the registration response:

HTTP/1.1 201 Created

Content-Type: application/json

Cache-Control: no-store

Pragma: no-cache

```
{
```

```
  "client_id": "b3886ff9-374b-4bd4-bbb3-0a6bb8d8108d",
```

```
  "client_id_issued_at": 1495115628,
```

```
  "registration_access_token":
```

```
  "eyJraWQiOiJyc2ExliwiYWxnIjoiUlMyNTYifQ.eyJhdWQiOiJiMzg4NmZmOS0zNzRiLTRiZDQ  
tYmJiMy0wYTZiYjkhODEwOGQiLCJpc3MiOiJodHRwczpcL1wvcGhyLWF1dGguaWcua2Fud  
GEuZmlcL3Boci1hdXRoc2VydmlvLXNhbmlhbmRib3hlcLyIsImhhdCI6MTQ5NTExNTYyOCwianRp  
IjoiYmM3ODFIOTQtNWYyZi00YTE3LWI4M2YtMjQ4YzYzNDE4In0.F58ZAHwLiB_KnoiU  
YrCaT8M5SwX1p5XUylaYLjwcBVSGx7JS49NmbksSzpt4QA4Nn3WUAdbLA7e34MMhwly  
Mu2OD7EpEgPqsDOQwcPdfQaW_w_96HjBS4Sfmp-RqzdICo-hxn_ORuf2cm-  
k_hftAqxujyqGvk3N-sFdKyqiU74",
```

```
  "registration_client_uri": "https://phrauth.kanta.fi/phr-authserver/register/b3886ff9-374b-  
4bd4-bbb3-0a6bb8d8108d",
```

```
  "redirect_uris": ["http://localhost/application/example"],
```

```
  "client_name": "The Example Software client",
```

```
  "token_endpoint_auth_method": "private_key_jwt",
```

```
  "scope": "patient/Observation.read offline_access patient/Observation.write",
```

```
  "grant_types": [
```

```
    "refresh_token",
```

```
    "authorization_code"
```

```
  ],
```



```
WY5In0.fB_Do19i0kITdn5vlsI_HsPAVjevPFEGLRg1k_i0sMt1daL-XW3D9F76OrzSZ1W8Rqx-  
u7OwPe5820idH-1a-w"
```

```
}
```

The authorization server will associate the issued `client_id` with the public key of the client instance. The client instance will be authenticated at the authorization endpoint and token endpoint using JWT tokens as per [RFC7523]. The tokens MUST be signed by the client instance using its private key and the algorithm named in the dynamic registration.

5 Authorization code flow

Authorization code flow is used by public clients for personal use and by confidential clients for personal use. The flow is shown in Fig. 3. The client retrieves a short-lived authorization code from the authorization endpoint of the authorization server, in order to trade it later for a set of tokens at the token endpoint. The authorization endpoint is called when the client needs authorization from the user to access resources. This may be the first time the client is used or if the client has not been granted a scope that it needs to access a resource. Authorization and token endpoints are described in [RFC6749]. Authorization and token urls may differ from each other.




Figure 5: Authorization code flow.

The authorization endpoint is called when the client needs authorization from the user to access resources. This may be the first time the client is used or if the client has not been granted a scope that it needs to access a resource. First the client requests and receives a short-lived authorization code which will be then traded for a set of tokens at the token endpoint. Before issuing the code, the authorization server authenticates the user and requests the user to confirm the access to their PHR account.

5.1 Authorization endpoint request parameters

Due to reasons described in [DIONA], public clients for personal use running on mobile platforms MUST use the system browser of the said platform or another external user-agent for calls to the authorization endpoint. Web-views (embedded user-agents) MUST NOT be used. If the platform supports in-app browser tabs, their use is RECOMMENDED for usability reasons.

The user-agent MUST be requested to open the authorization endpoint's URL with the following parameters:

Name	Cardinality	Value
response_type	required	"code"
client_id	required	The identifier of the client instance. For confidential clients, the id is provided in the client registration process, and for public clients the id is generated through dynamic registration of instances at the registration endpoint.
redirect_uri	required	Must match the URI registered for the client software at the registration time. Guidelines for redirect URI naming are provided in [DIONA].
scope	optional	The scopes that the client requests to be granted, separated using the +, %2B or %20 characters. If the value is skipped or empty, the authorization server will assume that the client is requesting all scopes registered for it.
state	required	The client MUST generate an unpredictable state parameter with at least 128 bits of entropy for each user session. The authorization server will include the state value when redirecting the user-agent to the redirect URI. The client MUST validate the state value for any request sent to its redirect URI.

Name	Cardinality	Value
lg	optional	<p>The language parameter provided by the application redirects the user to identify and authorize. Accepted languages are 'fi' / 'fi-FI' / 'fi-SE' , 'sv' / 'sv-SE' / 'sv-FI' or 'en' / 'en-GB'.</p> <p>If the parameter is unknown, the user is redirected to the English authorization page. If the parameter is missing from the request, or it is empty, the user is redirected to the Finnish authorization page.</p>
code_challenge	required when PKCE is configured for client otherwise optional	Random string generated according to RFC7636 (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7636#section-4.2)
code_challenge_method	required when PKCE is configured for client otherwise optional	"S256"

All parameters MUST be "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" formatted as defined in the Appendix B of [RFC6749]. The following is an example of the request sent to the authorization endpoint:

Location: https://phrauth.kanta.fi/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=8d415da7-bec9-44a3-8979-105ea5bf8ee4&redirect_uri=fi.sw-vendor.app%3A%2Fafter-auth&scope=patient%2FObservation.read+patient%2FObservation.write%20patient%2FMedicationAdministration.read&state=adf56kiwshti2k4

After verifying the parameters of the call, the authorization server will redirect the user-agent to Suomi.fi e-Identification, the Finnish national citizen authentication service. If the application uses the same authentication service that will show the citizen notification about authenticating to Kanta PHR. After successful authentication of the user, the authorization server shows the scopes that are requested by the client. Authorization server also shows which user is identified. If the identified user isn't the one using the service, it's possible to switch the user and authorization server redirects the user-agent to Suomi.fi e-Identification. The user is asked to confirm the scopes.

If the request fails, the client identifier is not valid or the access request is denied, the authorization server must not redirect the user-agent to the invalid redirection URI, but inform the resource owner or the client instead, depending on the case (see RFC6749 4.1.2.1. for details).

The authorization server will assign each user a pseudonym to be used with the PHR service. Pseudonyms are random UUID identifiers that are directly associated with the Finnish national identification numbers of the same persons. Clients will never receive original national identification numbers from the PHR service. User's pseudonym remains the same, for example when the application is authorized again.

After generating any required pseudonyms, the authorization server will redirect the user-agent to the redirect URI (client's redirection endpoint) provided in the authorization request. The following parameters are supplied with the redirect call:

Name	Cardinality	Value
code	required	The short-lived authorization code generated by the authorization server.
state	required	The value of the state parameter exactly as supplied by the client

Name	Cardinality	Value
		in the authorization request. The client MUST validate the state value for any request sent to its redirect URL and check whether it matches a submitted authorization request.

The following is an example of the redirect call:

Location: fi.sw-vendor.app:/after-auth?code=ahui560zxs12n3dq&state=adf56kiwshti2k

The authorization code is valid for 5 (five) minutes.

5.2 Token endpoint

After receiving an authorization code through the redirect call performed by the authorization server in the previous step, the client accesses the token endpoint in order to receive an access token and a refresh token. The client presents the authorization code along with its own credentials to the authorization server's token endpoint to obtain the said set of tokens. When an access token is expired, the client can request a new access token by presenting a valid refresh token.

5.2.1 Client authentication at the token endpoint

Confidential clients are authenticated with mutual TLS using client certificates.

Public clients for personal use are authenticated at the token endpoint using a JWT Bearer Token as per Section 2.2 of [RFC7523], following profiles [ARGONAUT] and [CORECONNECT]. The authentication JWT is self-issued by the client instance and signed using its private key generated during the client instance registration process (Section 4). The signature format follows JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7517]. The authentication JWT SHALL contain the following claims.

Name	Meaning	Cardinality	Value
iss	Issuer	required	client_id of the client instance
sub	Subject	required	client_id of the client instance
aud	Audience	required	The URL of the authorization server's token endpoint (the same URL to which this authentication JWT will be posted)
exp	Expiration time	required	The time on or after which the authentication JWT MUST NOT be accepted for processing. The time MUST be expressed in seconds since the "Epoch" (1970-01-01T00:00:00Z UTC). This time MUST be no more than 5 (five) minutes in the future.
jti	JWT ID	required	A unique identifier (nonce) of this authentication JWT. MUST have at least 128 bits of entropy and MUST NOT be reused in another token. The authorization server SHALL check for reuse of jti values and SHALL

Name	Meaning	Cardinality	Value
			reject all tokens issued with duplicate jti values.
kid	Key id	required	Key id of the key pair used to digitally sign this token. MUST match the value supplied with the software statement used during the client instance registration process.
ait	Issued at	required	The time on which the authentication JWT was generated.

Example:

```
{  
  
  "iss": "8d415da7-bec9-44a3-8979-105ea5bf8ee4",  
  
  "sub": "8d415da7-bec9-44a3-8979-105ea5bf8ee4",  
  
  "aud": "https://phrauth.kanta.fi/token",  
  
  "jti": "a9sk105fpwqn2n20",  
  
  "iat": 1505996055,  
  
  "exp": 1505996355,
```

```
"kid": "8bdd589e-ba42-4d6e-aea6-0d3ba43f5ed7"
```

```
}
```

5.2.2 Trading the authorization code for a set of tokens

The client trades the code for an access token, a refresh token and an ID token via a POST call to the PHR authorization server's token endpoint URL.

The following parameters are supplied with the call:

Name	Cardinality	Value
client_id	required	The id of the client
grant_type	required	"authorization_code"
code	required	The short-lived authorization code received from the authorization server.
redirect_uri	required	MUST match the URI used in the authorization request.
client_assertion_type	required	Required for public clients, with fixed value "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer". Omit for confidential clients.
client_assertion	required	Required for public clients. The value is a signed authentication JWT as described in Section 5.2.1. Omit for confidential clients.

Name	Cardinality	Value
state	optional	An opaque value used by the client to maintain state between the request and callback. If state parameter is provided with the request, PHR authorization server will return the exact value to the client.
code_verifier	required when PKCE is configured for client otherwise optional	Random string generated according to RFC7636 (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7636#section-4.1)

All parameters MUST be "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" formatted as defined in the Appendix B of [RFC6749]. The following is an example of the token request (with line wraps within values for display purposes only):

POST <https://phrauth-token.kanta.fi/phr-authserver/token> HTTP/1.1 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

grant_type=authorization_code

&code=4IKCd5

&state=adfh56kiwshti2k4

&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Flocalhost

&client_id=4393ab31-7753-472b-af74-dcb8b7b64c93

&client_assertion_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Aclient-assertion-type%3Ajwt-bearer

&client_assertion=eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiI0MzkzYWVzMS03NzUzLTQ3MmItYWY3NC1kY2I4YjdiNjRjOTMiLCJhdWQiOiJodHRwczpcL1wvcGhyLWF1dGguaWcua2FudGEuZmlcL3Boci1hdXRoc2VydmVyLXNhbmRib3hcLylsImtpZCI6IjZhODc0N2UxLWnkMWYtNGExMi1iNDE3LWMyNTFIYmRhZTY4YyIsImlzcyl6IjQzOTNhYjMxLTc3NTMtNDcyYi1hZjc0LWRjYjhiN2I2NGM5MyIsImV4cCI6MTQ5NTE5NjY3MywiaWF0IjoxNDk1MTE2MzczLCJqdGkiOiJlMmYwYTtxNS02ZjhiLTQ4NzYtYmU5Ny03NjYwNzU2ZWU1YmYifQ.9UL58yw4mxrQUGwbCdZjqDwsYWEkNY__EWFtU0vuJTrewNxnDT36fajlx6aXIXZQm7zJjk7497XTVSNdR9fUog

The PHR authorization server will return a JSON structure that includes an access token or a message indicating that the authorization request has been denied.

The JSON structure includes the following parameters:

Name	Cardinality	Value
access_token	required	The access token issued by the authorization server
token_type	required	Fixed value: Bearer
expires_in	required	Lifetime in seconds of the access token, after which the token SHALL NOT be accepted by the resource server
scope	required	Scope of access authorized.
state	required	The exact value received from the client in the token request.
refresh_token	required	Token that can be used to obtain a new access token

Name	Cardinality	Value
sub	required	Application user's PHR pseudonym
id_token	optional	Authenticated patient pseudonym identity, added if openid scope exist
principal	optional	Child's PHR pseudonym (NYI)

```
{  
  
"access_token":"eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImR0b2R5IjoiaGVhZGVzIiwiaWF0IjoiMTY1MzU2NzUyLjE0In0=",  
  
"token_type":"Bearer",  
  
"expires_in":3599,  
  
"scope":"patient/Observation.read+patient/Observation.write+openid",  
  
"sub": "44a12254-b28d-42f9-8bec-4a468473ef9f",  
  
"refresh_token":"eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImR0b2R5IjoiaGVhZGVzIiwiaWF0IjoiMTY1MzU2NzUyLjE0In0=",  
  
"id_token":"eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImR0b2R5IjoiaGVhZGVzIiwiaWF0IjoiMTY1MzU2NzUyLjE0In0=",  
  
"state":"adf56kiwshti2k4"  
  
}
```

The access token is used in all calls to the resource server to obtain resources. The token parameter shall be sent as the Bearer http-header to the FHIR resource server as defined in section 2.1 in RFC6750.

In addition to the access token native app for personal use need to use similar client assertion JWT token to authenticate with the resource server. It should be sent in the header PhrJWTAuthentication.

6 Client for professional use

This profile is used when the application user is a healthcare professional. When this profile is used the user isn't authenticated with Suomi.fi authentication service, the responsibility for authenticating the application user is in the client or in the EHR if the client is integrated to EHR system.

Also in this profile the application user doesn't give consent to the client to use PHR information because the information that is handled isn't user's own information. Access to the information is granted by the resource owner (citizen) with separate consent.

This profile is somewhat similar to Argonaut project's draft "Cross-Organization Data Access Profile". JWT used for authorization grant is similar, but the organization's authorization server is authenticated with mutual TLS instead of authentication JWT which is used in the Argonaut's model.




Figure 6 JWT Authorization Grant

In professional application use cases, the application or EHR is responsible for authenticating the user. The organization's authorization server sends JWT to the PHR authorization endpoint. PHR authorization server validates JWT and generates the access token which is eventually returned to the organization. The access token is used within the resource request.

6.1 Token request

The authorization request is a JWT, as defined in RFC7519 and contains the details the PHR authorization server will need to know in order to mediate the request for access to a FHIR resource. The HTTP parameters for transporting the authorization JWT from the organization's authorization server to the PHR authorization server's token endpoint is as defined in The OAuth Assertion Framework RFC7521, with the following specific parameter values and encodings.

The value of the "grant_type" MUST BE "urn:fi:kela:kanta:phr:oauth:grant-type:finnish-phr-jwt".

The value of the "assertion" parameter MUST contain a single authorization JWT.

Claim	Priority	Argonaut	PHR
sub	required	EHR-A's id for the user on whose behalf this request is being made. Matches requesting_practitioner.id	Practitioner's identification, SSN or Terhikki-/Suosikki or valid identification number of VRK identification card
acr	not used	Level of assurance of the requesting user's identity (e.g. NIST level 0-4, as defined in NIST SP 800-63-2)	not used
aud	required	EHR-B authorization server's token_URL (the URL to which this authorization JWT will be posted)	PHR-Authorization server URL
requested_record	required	The FHIR patient resource being requested	Patient's social security number
requested_scopes	optional	Patient data being requested	Scopes requested
requesting_organization	required		The organization oid of the social and healthcare service

Claim	Priority	Argonaut	PHR
			provider making request
requesting_practitioner	required	FHIR practitioner resource making the request	Practitioner's identification, SSN or Terhikki-/Suosikki or valid identification number of VRK identification card
reason_for_request	required	Purpose for which access is being requested	Encounter OID that is used to check the care relationship with the patient
application_version	required		Version identifier of the application
application_name	required		Name of the application
special_reason	conditional		If the encounter is created by the same professional that is making the request to PHR the reason for doing so
exp	required	Expiration time integer after which this authorization JWT MUST be considered invalid; expressed in seconds	Expiration time of the token, this time MUST be no more

Claim	Priority	Argonaut	PHR
		since the "Epoch" (1970-01-01T00:00:00Z UTC). This time MUST be no more than five minutes in the future.	than five minutes in the future.
kid	required	Key id of the encryption key used to digitally sign this token	OID of the SSL certificate used to authenticate the client that sent the JWT
jti	required	A nonce string value that uniquely identifies this authorization JWT. MUST have at least 128 bits of entropy and MUST NOT be reused in another token. EHR-B MUST check for reuse of jti values and MUST reject all tokens issued with duplicate jti values.	Unique nonce
iat	required	The UTC time the JWT was created by EHR-A	Time of JWT creation, this time MUST be no more than five minutes in the past.

Example of the JWT

```
{
```

```
"iss": "ProfessionalClientExample",

"sub": "terhi-123",

"aud": "https://phrauth.kanta.fi/phr-authserver/",

"requested_record": "240497-9070",

"requested_scopes": "patient/Observation.read+patient/Observation.write",

"requesting_practitioner": "0000123123123",

"requesting_organization": "1.2.246.123123123",

"application_version": "1.0",

"application_name": "Phr Professional Client for Company",

"reason_for_request": "1.2.246.123567890",

"exp": 1495117297,

"kid": "7890",

"jti": "some-unique-nonce-abc",

"iat": 1495117247

}
```

6.2 Access token response

The PHR authorization server returns either a JSON structure that includes an access token, as defined in RFC6749 and RFC6750, or a message indicating that the authorization request has been denied.

The JSON structure includes the following parameters:

Field	Explanation
access_token	The access token issued by the PHR authorization server
sub	Registration number (Terhikki/Suosikki/SSN)
token_type	Fixed value: Bearer
expires_in	Lifetime in seconds of the access token, after which the token isn't accepted by the resource server. Lifetime of the token in PHR is one hour.
scope	Scope of access authorized
patient	Patient's PHR pseudonym

7 Supported scopes in Finnish Kanta PHR

Scopes supported by the Finnish Kanta PHR can be divided into the scopes that grant access to specific FHIR resources stored on the resource server and to scopes that allow applications to obtain other information and keep the authorization active.

7.1 User scopes for data access

Scopes that can be granted to access resources on the resource server are defined similarly to SMART on FHIR scopes.

To read a resource you need to have the `patient/Resource.read` –scope. For writing, updating and deleting the resource `patient/Resource.write` scope is needed. A scope is needed only for the main resource type, contained resources that are inline in the resource to be read or written follow the scope of the resource that they are part of. Referenced resources are subject of the scope of their respective type.

All requested scopes that can be authorized by user to the application, need to be registered for the application at the registration time. Only registered scopes are allowed to request authorization for. All scopes that are included in the access token need to be authorized by the user.

Scope	Contents
patient/Observation.read	Reading patient observations, like heart rate
patient/Observation.write	Creating, updating and deleting observation
patient/MedicationStatement.read	Reading the medication statement-resource
patient/MedicationStatement.write	Creating, updating and deleting medication statement
patient/MedicationAdministration.read	Reading the medication administration-resource
patient/MedicationAdministration.write	Creating, updating and deleting medication administration
patient/QuestionnaireResponse.read	Reading the questionnaire response-resource
patient/QuestionnaireResponse.write	Creating, updating and deleting questionnaire response
patient/CarePlan.read	Reading the care plan-resource
patient/CarePlan.write	Creating, updating and deleting care plan
patient/Consent.write	Creating and updating consent
patient/Consent.read	Reading the consent resource

7.2 Non user-specific scopes

Scope	Contents
CapabilityStatement.read	Reading the capability statement
StructureDefinition.read	Reading different structure definitions
StructureDefinition.write	Creating, updating and deleting structure definitions
ValueSet.read	Reading different value sets
ValueSet.write	Creating, updating and deleting different value sets
CodeSystem.read	Reading different code systems
CodeSystem.write	Creating, updating and deleting different code systems
Questionnaire.read	Reading the questionnaire-resource
Questionnaire.write	Creating, updating and deleting questionnaire

7.3 Technical scopes

There are in addition the user scopes that provide access to protected resources on the server some more technical scopes. These are the “offline_access” scope and “openid” scope.

The “offline_access” is defined in OpenId Core specification and enables the client to request new access token after expiration using the refresh token granted at the authorization time. The “openid” is defined in OpenId core specifications and enables the client to identify the user.

8 Security considerations

All transactions **MUST** be protected in transit by TLS as described in BCP195 [BCP195].

All clients **MUST** conform to applicable recommendations found in the Security Considerations sections of [RFC6749] and those found in the OAuth 2.0 Threat Model and Security Considerations document [RFC6819].

All clients **MUST** conform to applicable recommendations in the OWASP Mobile security project's Secure Mobile Development Guidelines [OWASP].

9 References

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